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he third Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit at Vilnius on November 28-29th could have 
spurred  a  ‘Thessaloniki  moment’  for  the  post-Soviet  countries  bordering  the  EU’s 
eastern  periphery,  but  it  failed  to  deliver.  The  analogy  refers  to  the  2003  Summit 
between the EU and the countries of the Western Balkans, at which the latter were offered a 
clear  prospect  of  future  integration  with  the  EU.  But  instead  of  defining  the  geopolitical 
finalité  of  EU-EaP  relations  by  projecting  a  path  towards  future  accession  to  the  EU  for 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the initial ambition for the 
Vilnius Summit was thwarted.  
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU constructed its relations with the Eastern 
neighbours on the basis of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). All of these 
accords (except the one with Belarus) entered into force in the second half of the 1990s for a 
period of 10 years and have been automatically renewed since the expiry of their first period 
of validity. In 2004, the agreements were enveloped into the wider European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) and the bilateral action plans developed jointly by the EU and each of the 
neighbouring countries. The action plans are ‘benchmarked roadmaps’ aimed at introducing 
reforms needed to bring the neighbours closer to the EU. Whereas the policy developed to 
match new realities, the static contractual relations gradually went out of date. In the wake of 
the inaugural EaP Summit in Prague in May 2009 and the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty  later  that  same  year,  the  EU  has  been  working  to  upgrade  both  its  bilateral  and 
multilateral  relations  with  the  Eastern  neighbours.  The  flagship  document  underpinning 
each newly defined bilateral relationship is the Association Agreement (AA), which includes 
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).  
After more than three years of negotiations, Moldova and Georgia initialled their respective 
AAs/DCFTAs  with  the  EU  at  Vilnius.  However,  after  intense  pressure  from  Russia,  the 
Armenian and Ukrainian Presidents abandoned negotiations with the EU before the Summit 
took place.1 In response, the EU – pushed by some of its member states – watered down the 
                                                   
1 See M. Emerson and H. Kostanyan, “Putin’s grand design to destroy the EU’s Eastern Partnership 
and replace it with a disastrous neighbourhood policy of his own”, CEPS Commentary, 17 September 
2013. 
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final  declaration  of  the  Summit.  Whereas  an  early  draft  declaration  acknowledged  the 
sovereign  right  of  each  of  the  six  Eastern  Partnership  states  to  choose  the  scope  of  its 
ambitions and final goal of its relations with the European Union and to decide “whether to 
remain partners in accordance with Article 8 of the Treaty of the European Union [TEU] or 
follow  its  European  aspirations  in  accordance  with  Article  49  thereof” 
(http://www.rferl.org/content/eu-neighbors-eastern-statement/25153908.html),  the  EU 
removed the reference to Article 49 from the final version. As a result, the Vilnius Summit 
fell far short of serving as a ‘rite de passage’ towards full integration with the EU. 
To be sure, the fact that some member states succeeded in eliminating Article 49 from the 
declaration  need  not  mean  an  end  to  the  membership  dream  of  some  of  the  Eastern 
neighbours. Indeed, the language employed in the joint declaration is fuzzy enough to allow 
EaP  countries  to  find  support  from  the  EU  to  materialise  their  wish  to  move  beyond 
neighbourhood status: “The participants reaffirm the particular role for the Partnership to 
support  those  who  seek  an  ever  closer  relationship  with  the  EU.  The  Association 
Agreements,  including  DCFTAs,  are  a  substantial  step  in  this  direction.”  Arguably,  the 
phrase “ever closer relationship” can be read in the Thessaloniki spirit, in the sense that the 
Eastern Partnership provides the framework for the “European course of the [EaP] countries, 
all the way to their future accession”. 
This interpretation is confirmed if one considers that the summit declaration is only one 
element of the EU’s substantive offer to the EaP countries. As we argue elsewhere, a close 
reading of the AAs/DCFTAs and a comparative analysis of their material substance with 
that  of  the  most  recent  Stabilisation  and  Association  Agreements  (SAAs)  reveals  that  in 
many aspects (e.g. rights and obligations, timeframes for the reduction of duties and the 
uniform application of standards and the harmonisation of laws), the agreements with EaP 
countries  are  more  advanced  than  the  pre-accession  agreements  of  the  countries  of  the 
Western Balkans.2 Leaving the rhetoric in the preambles and the political part of the AAs 
aside, the DCFTAs and the sectoral cooperation exhibit a large number of legally binding 
commitments  that  exceed  those  in  the  SAAs  both  in  scope  of  coverage  and  level  of 
enforcement.  
For instance, the AA with Ukraine includes commitments in most so-called ‘WTO+’ policy 
areas – technical barriers to trade (TBTs), customs administration, intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) and trade in services – that far outweigh those enshrined in the SAA for Serbia, which 
is (at least in theory) reciprocated by wider and faster access to the EU market in industrial 
goods.  Importantly,  some  “WTOx”  policy  areas  (competition,  energy)  are  covered  by  a 
sophisticated dispute settlement mechanism in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement to 
embolden their legal enforceability, whereas such arrangements are missing in the SAA with 
Serbia.  Furthermore,  other  provisions  of  WTOx  policy  areas  (environment,  transport, 
employment,  etc.)  prescribe  the  transposition  of  the  EU  acquis  into  Ukraine’s  legislation 
according to strict schedules set out in the AA’s annexes. 
This shows the blurred boundaries between the material substance of the most prestigious 
instruments aimed at contractually defining EU relations with different categories of Eastern 
European  countries.  In  our  view,  the  EU  might  not  be  able  to  legitimately  maintain  the 
political  schism  between  its  ‘enlargement’  and  ‘enlargement  minus’  (i.e.  European 
Neighbourhood) policies. Indeed, the Eastern partners that sign, ratify and implement the 
AA/DCFTA will effectively be treated as more than just neighbours of the EU in the sense of 
Article 8 TEU, even if no explicit membership perspective is enshrined in their agreement.  
                                                   
2 S. Blockmans, H. Kostanyan and I. Vorobiov, “Eastern Partnership: More than neighbours”, CEPS 
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Moldova and Georgia may move in that direction, despite the likelihood that they will come 
under more aggressive pressure from Russia in the coming months. The threat of stricter 
Russian  immigration  policy  could  see  thousands  of  Moldovans  and  Georgians  expelled; 
more  trade sanctions  could  be  employed  by Russia;  and new  tensions  in  the  breakaway 
republics  of  Transnistria,  Abkhazia  and  South  Ossetia  may  lead  to  a  worsening  of  the 
security situation after the winter Olympics in Sochi.  
The EU’s offer of the AA/DCFTA remains on the table for Ukraine. The public anger and 
mass protests against Russia’s role in persuading Yanukovich not to sign the AA/DCFTA 
with the EU has made it all but impossible for the Ukrainian President to take the alternative 
route  offered  by  the  Kremlin,  i.e.  joining  the  customs  union  with  Russia,  Belarus  and 
Kazakhstan. Any compromise with the protesters would have to revive the AA/DCFTA and 
reduce Russia’s sway. 
For all the reasons mentioned above, the EU and its member states should not miss another 
opportunity to fully embrace the Eastern partners’ European choice and match such action 
with an unequivocal offer of a framework leading all the way to the future accession of 
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